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Abstract  
This paper examines the victim participation framework at the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC or Court), established to deal with crimes during the 
Khmer Rouge regime. The background which has led to the creation of the ECCC will be 
explained, before the paper will look at the way the Court is structured to include civil 
parties. The Court has consistently limited the civil parties’ role since its establishment 
and these limitations and the justifications are outlined in the paper. Solutions in the 
context of the ECCC are then considered, although due to the political environment, no 
changes in favour of victim rights are likely. Future models are considered, with the 
benefits of a Truth and Conciliation Commission’s analysed by looking at Sierra Leone 
and East Timor, as examples of successful frameworks where both a Court and a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission proceeded simultaneously. This paper concludes that 
although every situation requiring a judicial response will be different, the option of having 
both a Court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission can fulfil multiple victim needs.  
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I Introduction 
 
They were our parents, our children, our relatives, our colleagues and our friends. Those of us 
who survived have lived for a quarter of a century bearing pain and grief for those we lost and 
being haunted by the nightmare of our own experiences. 
   -Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, Hun Sen.1 
 
The Khmer Rouge, under the leadership of Pol Pot, ruled Cambodia between 1975 and 
1979. The stories which flowed from the country and out to the world through articles, 
books, reports and eventually movies depict a time of horror and heartbreak that for most 
of us is unimaginable. After difficult negotiations, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea (the ECCC or Court) finally came into being in 2005. A hybrid 
court, its structure is based on the Cambodian judicial system which, in turn, is based on 
the French civil law system, allocating victims a significant role in the proceedings through 
the mechanism of civil parties.  
 
Despite its flexible victim participation framework, it soon became obvious that difficulties 
would not allow the framework to work in the way that it was originally intended. The 
flexibility and scope of participation has now been dramatically reduced. This is largely 
due to the conflicting principles of the right of the defendant to a fair trial and the 
importance of efficient justice. These decisions have significantly compromised the 
effectiveness of the victim participation framework and the purposes for which it was 
established. It is of great importance for the future of the ECCC and potential future ad-
hoc criminal tribunals that lessons are learnt from the experience of the ECCC with victim 
participation. It is argued that when assessing how victims should participate in a trial 
process, the existing legal framework, the situation which the tribunal will respond to and 
other factors such as necessity of speed and the number of victims, must be taken into 
account. A consideration which should always be present is aiming to provide a forum for 
  
1 An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials (5th ed, Secretariat of the Royal Government Task Force, Phnom 
Penh, 2004) at 1.  
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victims to tell their story and play a part in the justice process. This may be through the 
trial, or where this is not appropriate or possible, truth and reconciliation commissions can 
be an effective alternative forum to promote national reconciliation and truth finding 
without interfering with the court process. In terms of tribunals themselves, more clarity 
and definition must be given to the victim’s role from the start. It is unavoidable that in 
some situations where victim numbers are large such as in Cambodia, their role will have 
to be highly regulated and limited due to principles of defendants’ rights and efficient 
justice. Due to this, it is important that victim’s roles are clearly defined from the beginning 
and that decision is clearly communicated to the victims. 
 
This paper will first consider the context which has led to the need for the Court before 
explaining the ways in which victims participate at the Court and at other international 
criminal tribunals. After briefly looking at the role of outreach, the paper will assess the 
limitations and modifications which have limited the role of civil parties at the Court. These 
limitations will then be assessed against the important legal principles which have led to 
them, before looking at options for the ECCC and future tribunals. 
 
The two trials which have been conducted to date will be the focus of this paper. Two trials 
remain in the investigative stage of the process and it is unclear whether they will ever 
proceed to the trial stages, making them largely unhelpful in assessing the existing victim 
participation framework. It remains important to keep the two trials in mind, when 
considering future developments of the civil party framework. 
 
II The Cambodian Context 
A The Khmer Rouge Regime 
In April 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea, commonly known as the Khmer 
Rouge, seized power and became the Government of Cambodia, under the political and 
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ideological leadership of Pol Pot.2 The party sought a communist revolution, implementing 
policies to rid the country of perceived enemies of this objective, through widespread and 
violent campaigns of displacement, forced labour, arrests, tortures and executions.3 The 
lack of comprehensive records makes it impossible to accurately predict the number of 
deaths, though historians estimate between 1.5 and 1.7 million deaths occurred during the 
three and a half years of rule.4 That figure amounts to roughly 20 per cent of the population 
of Cambodia at the time the Khmer Rouge took power.5 The Khmer Rouge regime ended 
due to a full scale invasion of Vietnamese forces; however, many leaders and members of 
the movement fled to the Cambodia-Thai border and continued an armed resistance.6 This 
resistance ended in 1993, primarily due to the defection of Khmer Rouge guerrillas in 
response to offers of amnesty from prosecution by the Cambodian Government. 7 Among 
those offered amnesty in exchange for acknowledging the Cambodian Government was 
Ieng Sary, a highly ranked official during the Regime.8 However, this amnesty proved to 
be ineffective against the hybrid tribunal, as Ieng Sary was one of four defendants in Case 
002, though he died during the proceedings.9 
 
B The Years Following the Regime 
In the years following the Khmer Rouge rule, the Vietnamese installed a government in 
Cambodia, which included former Khmer Rouge soldiers who had defected to Vietnam 
during the war. This group included Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge Battalion 
Commander.10 He began as Foreign Minister, but became Prime Minister of Cambodia in 
  
2 Brian Tittemore “Evolving Dynamic of Intervention to End Atrocities and Securing Accountability for 
Gross Violations of Human Rights and the Implications of Non Intervention: The Lesson of Cambodia” 
(2000) 7 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 447 at 448. 
3 Tittemore, above n 2, at 448. 
4 Sarah Williams “Genocide: The Cambodian Experience” (2005) 5 Int’l Crim L Rev 549 at 553. 
5 Williams, above n 4, at 553. 
6 Benny Widyono “The Spectre of the Khmer Rouge over Cambodia” (2008) 45 UN Chronicle 25 at 25. 
7 Tittemore, above n 2, at 449. 
8 Daniel Donovan “Joint UN-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer Rouge Tribunal” (2003) 44 Harv Int’l 
LJ 551 at 556. 
9 Donovan, above n 8, at 560. 
10 Joel Brinkley “Justice Squandered: Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal” (2013) 176 Wld Aff 41 at 41. 
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1998 and remains Prime Minister today.11 Hun Sen, despite initially asking for help from 
the international community, has been viewed as largely uncooperative in the establishment 
of a joint tribunal with United Nations (UN) involvement.12 This is most likely due to his 
Khmer Rouge links and a desire to protect himself and his colleagues from associations 
with the accused in the trials.13 In addition to this there have been suggestions that China, 
an influential power in Cambodia which has supported the Khmer Rouge in the past, was 
opposed to a purely international tribunal, though China and Cambodia have both denied 
this.14 
C Negotiations for a Criminal Tribunal 
The negotiations began for a joint tribunal between Cambodia and the UN with a letter 
written by Hun Sen to the Secretary General of the UN in 1997. The letter requested the 
assistance of the International Community and the UN in “bringing justice to those persons 
responsible for the genocide and/or crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer 
Rouge”.15 A UN Working Group was established to determine the feasibility of bringing 
the leaders to justice and options for trials, finding that a predominantly international 
tribunal would be the most suitable option.16 The UN Working Group Report focused very 
little on the role which victims would be afforded in the process, mentioning briefly the 
importance of reparations to the victims and discussing the viability of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of some kind.17 The report was rejected by Hun Sen, as was a 
following proposal due to his belief that the Cambodian legal system was capable of 
  
11 Williams, above n 4, at 554. 
12 “Cambodia: Government Obstructs Khmer Rouge Court” (5 September 2013) Human Rights Watch 
<www.hrw.org>. 
13 Williams, above n 4, at 554. 
14 Alexandra Kent “Friction and Security at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal” (2013) 28 J of Social Issues in 
Southeast Asia 299 at 311. 
15 Williams, above n 4, at 557. 
16 Scott Luftglass “Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nations’ Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement 
from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge” (2004) 90 Va L Rev 893 
at 895. 
17 Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135 
A/53/850 (1999) at [202], [212]; Elisa Hoven, Mareike Feiler and Saskia Scheibel Victims in Trials of Mass 
Crimes: A Multi-Perspective Study of Civil Party Participation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia (Institution for International Peace and Security Law, Cologne, 2013) at 14.  
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holding the trials.18 Cambodia in turn put forward a proposal, which was rejected by the 
UN by reason of Cambodia’s failure to compromise on basic issues of international law.19 
Talks came to a standstill until Hun Sen again called for help, which resulted in the March 
Agreement of 2003, instructing the development of a joint tribunal.20 At the time of the 
March Agreement, the international community was attracted to the joint or ‘hybrid’ court, 
putting in place hybrid tribunals in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia.21 This was 
due to the cost of international tribunals and the “tribunal fatigue” as a resulting of the 
“lack-lustre” performances of the tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and uncertainties 
surrounding the ICC.22 The March Agreement attracted criticism in regard to the 
combination of international judicial participation and domestic judicial establishment, 
which was criticised as lacking the safeguards of an international tribunal. The majority 
that the domestic judges were to hold was a particular concern, though this was mitigated 
by a “supermajority” requirement in each chamber.23 The March agreement was further 
criticised for the significant burden it placed on the underdeveloped Cambodian legal 
system and the power it awarded to the Cambodian government, which suffers from a 
history of “systematic corruption”.24 
D The Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (The ECCC) 
The agreement establishing the Court formally came into force in 2005, with several 
features making it a “unique experience in international justice”.25 The Court is known as 
a hybrid tribunal, with elements of both national and international adjudication.26 The Court 
  
18 Katheryn Klein “Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: The Challenges and Risks Facing the Joint Tribunal 
in Cambodia” (2006) 4 North Western J of Int’l HR 549 at [16]. 
19 Luftglass, above n 16, at 895. 
20 Brinkley, above n 10, at 42. 
21 Alberto Costi “Hybrid Tribunals as a Viable Transitional Justice Mechanism to Combat Impunity in Post-
Conflict Situations” (2006) 22 NZULR 213 at 225. 
22 Costi, above n 21, at 225. 
23 Williams, above n 4, at 559; John Ciorciari and Anne Heindel “Experiments in International Criminal 
Justice: Lessons from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal” (2014) 35 Mich J Int’l L 369 at 393. 
24 Williams, above n 4,at 560. 
25 Andrew Cayley “Prosecuting Mass Atrocities at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” 
(2012) 11 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 445 at 445. 
26 Seeta Scully “Judging the Successes and Failures of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of 
Cambodia” (2011) 13 APLPJ 300 at 318. 
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is the first internationalised court to consist of a majority of judges from the affected nation, 
giving the national judges a majority in each chamber which remained important to 
Cambodia throughout the negotiation and establishment process.27 Cambodia’s colonial 
ties with France mean its judicial system is based on the civil law model. This resulted in 
a high level of victim participation which allowed on paper, victims to be civil parties to 
the claim.28  
 
The court’s process begins with an investigation by the co-prosecutors, which consist of 
one Cambodian prosecutor and one international prosecutor, who identify crimes, suspects 
and evidence.29 The prosecutors then transmit an introduction summary to the co-
investigating judges, consisting of one Cambodian and one international judge.30 They then 
carry out a detailed judicial investigation of the allegations made in the introduction 
summary, before either dismissing the claim or submitting a closing order, which is the 
equivalent to an indictment in the common law system.31  Once this is made, the parties 
may appeal in the pre-trial chamber, which is constituted by three Cambodian Judges and 
two international judges, as is the trial chamber.32 Once this closing order is settled by the 
pre-trial chamber it is transferred to the trial chamber where the trial of the suspect will 
take place.33 Upon judgment of the trial chamber, the parties may appeal to the supreme 
court chamber, consisting of four Cambodian judges and three international judges, which 
rules with finality.34 To date, two trials have been conducted, one trial is about to begin, 
and two other cases remain with the co-investigating judges.35 
 
The importance of establishing the ECCC is clear in Article 52 of the Cambodian 
Constitution, which requires Cambodia to “adopt the policy of national reconciliation to 
  
27 Cayley, above n 25, at 445. 
28 For the number of civil parties for each case, see Appendix II. 
29 Internal Rules of the ECCC 2007 (Cambodia), r 50. 
30 Internal Rules, r 53 (1). 
31 Internal Rules, r 67. 
32 Internal Rules, r 23 (3). 
33 Internal Rules, r 79. 
34 Internal Rules, r 104. 
35 For a list of the cases, see Appendix I. 
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ensure national unity”. However, as will be seen, there are questions about the extent to 
which the ECCC does this. Particularly the questionable political influence, the constant 
limiting of victim participation and the restricted personal jurisdiction means that the Court 
is limited in its ability to meet this requirement of the Constitution. 36 One author goes as 
far as to suggest that by not ensuring national reconciliation and unity, the ECCC is 
undermining and in breach of the Cambodian Constitution.37 Reconciliation and truth will 
be important themes of this paper, when assessing the success of victim participation 
measures and of the court as a whole. 
 
III Victim Participation in International Criminal Tribunals 
A Definition of Victim Participation 
At the ECCC, a victim is defined as “any person or legal entity who has suffered from 
physical, psychological, or material harm as a direct consequence of the crimes committed 
in Cambodia by the Democratic Kampuchea regime between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 
1979 that are under the jurisdiction of the ECCC.”38 Victim participation can be defined in 
four categories; control, consultation, information provision and expression.39 The most 
relevant to this paper is expression which involves the Court giving victims the option of 
supplying information and expressing emotions.40 
B Victim Participation at other Criminal Trials 
International tribunals have often give victims a comparatively smaller role in the 
proceedings than was originally given to victims at the ECCC. At the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, victim participation is encouraged though significant limits are placed on their 
involvement. Victims are not permitted to be involved in pre-trial investigation or 
sentencing and may only intervene in proceedings where authorised by the pre-trial 
  
36 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1993 (Cambodia), art 52. 
37 Tessa Capeloto “Reconciliation in the Wake of Tragedy: Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers Undermines 
the Cambodian Constitution” 17 Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 103 at 111. 
38 Internal Rules, r 23 (2). 
39 Jo-Anne Wemmers “Victim Participation and Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2008) 3 Victims & Offenders 
165 at 167. 
40 Wemmers, above n 39, at 167. 
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judges.41 Additionally, they may be required to be represented by a single joint legal 
representative on behalf of all victims.42 In contrast, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) granted no rights to victims in proceedings, 
other than testifying as witnesses.43 
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) allows victim participation at a stage in the 
proceedings that the Court considers appropriate, where the personal interests of the victim 
are affected.44 The participation, where allowed by the Court, must be carried out in 
accordance with the ICC rules and the manner in which victims may present their views 
must not be prejudicial to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.45 An example of victims 
participating in ICC proceedings is Lubanga, the first case to come to legal judgment at the 
court.46 Lubanga broadly concerned child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Thomas Lubanga’s recruitment of children under the age of 15 to act as soldiers. These 
children were subject to harsh training regimes, severe punishment and forced to actively 
participate in hostilities.47 It was decided by the Court that victims were permitted to make 
opening and closing statements, though due to the victims participating anonymously, they 
would not be able to add any facts to evidence or to question witnesses.48 Criticism of 
victim involvement in the trial has focused on the lack of formal address to the views and 
concerns which victims raised during the proceedings and, as at the ECCC, there were 
  
41 Jerome de Hemptinne “Challenges Raised by Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon” (2010) 8 JICJ 165 at 166. 
42 de Hemptinne, above n 41, at 166. 
43 Matthew Gillett “Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court” (2009) 16 Aust ILJ 29 at 30; 
Ruth Mackenzie and others The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010) at 32. 
44 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 90 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002), Article 86 (3). 
45 Article 86 (3).  
46 Claire Garbett “The Truth and the Trial: Victim Participation, Restorative Justice and the International 
Criminal Court” (2013) 16 Contemporary Justice Rev 193 at 194. 
47 Lucia Catani “Victims at the International Criminal Court: Some Lessons Learned from the Lubanga Case” 
(2012) 10 JICJ 905 at 913. 
48 Bridie McAsey “Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court and its Impact on Procedural 
Fairness” (2011) 18 Aust ILJ 105 at 110. 
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concerns about compromising the rights of the accused.49 Further, there are concerns that 
the judgment failed to address the harm caused to the victims or to identify how the victims 
participated and aided the trial and construction of the truth.50 There is clearly still work to 
be done at the ICC to ensure that victim involvement in the trials is there for a purpose and 
is a positive experience for the victim. 
C The Importance of Outreach 
Although not the focus of this paper, an important element of ensuring that victim 
participation is successful, is outreach. Without outreach and knowledge of the ECCC, 
including victims in the process will be unsuccessful, as will the important object of 
showing Cambodia that justice has been done. This is particularly difficult in Cambodia 
where 85 per cent of the population lives rurally, without access to technology or news 
sources and a majority are illiterate.51 In 2009, a nationwide study found that 85 per cent 
of Cambodians had little or no knowledge of the ECCC, a statistic which proves that the 
court is at risk of making very little contribution to national reconciliation.52 The 
importance of outreach can also be illustrated through the successes and failures of other 
international tribunals. The ICTY and the ICTR did not establish outreach programmes 
until at least three years after their creation, with the effect that public perception was 
damaged and the people were not trusting of either tribunal.53 In contrast, Sierra Leone 
established a comprehensive outreach unit from the beginning and worked hard to ensure 
education and outreach, which led to 79 per cent of people in Sierra Leone indicating in a 
survey that they understood the role of the Court. 54 
 
  
49 Garbett, above n 46, at 111. 
50 Garbett, above n 46, at 206. 
51 Norman Pentelovitch “Seeing Justice Done: Prioritizing Outreach at International Criminal Tribunals” 
(2007) 39 Geo J Int’l L 449 at 466. 
52 Pentelovitch, above n 51, at 467. 
53 Sara Darehshori “Lessons for Outreach from the Ad Hoc Tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
and the International Criminal Court” (2007) 14 New Eng J Int’l & Comp L 299 at 301. 
54 Pentelovitch, above n , at 461. 
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Efforts so far at the ECCC at outreach have so far been limited, with the role largely given 
to non-governmental organisations (NGOs).55 One important programme which has been 
implemented by NGOs are monthly public forums, where members in the community come 
together to listen to speakers, ask questions and receive materials. 56 As will be discussed, 
this programme could be extended in the future to incorporate an element of informal truth 
telling, which could then combine the aims of outreach and national reconciliation. 
D Victim Participation at the ECCC 
The two trials which have so far been conducted in the trial chamber have faced many 
difficulties, as is often the case with experimental court structures and procedures. One 
element of the trial which has faced significant difficulties is the way in which victims are 
able to participate. Victims may be involved in the judicial proceedings from the beginning 
of the investigation. The Internal Rules provide that public action may be taken by any 
person, organisation or other source who witnessed, or was a victim of such crimes, or who 
has knowledge of such crimes.57 These people may complain to the co-prosecutors, who 
will decide at their discretion whether to reject the complaint, include it in an ongoing 
investigation or to conduct a new preliminary investigation.58 This provides an opportunity 
to victims or the family of victims to make a claim which could contribute to a case against 
the defendant. 
E Victims as Civil Parties 
The most important opportunity to participate for victims or relatives of them is as civil 
parties, which results in being recognised as party to the proceedings and being able to seek 
collective and moral reparations. The role of victims as civil parties in the ECCC is applied 
according to the Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code. The rationale for this is that the 
ECCC is integrated into the Cambodian court structure, aiding the judicial process and 
  
55 Peter Manning “Governing Memory: Justice, Reconciliation and Outreach at the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia” (2011) 5 Mem Studies 165 at 167. 
56 Pentelovitch, above n 51, at 467. 
57 Internal Rules, r 49 (2). 
58 Rule 49 (4). 
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creating a strong base for civil parties within the civil law framework.59 The Internal Rules 
of the ECCC were designed to fill in the gaps in the Cambodian Code in relation to civil 
parties and broadly state that their purpose in the proceedings is in support of the 
prosecution. The rules were the product of a complex drafting process, which involved 11 
months of discussion of judges from different countries and different legal systems. The 
discussions ended with the conclusion and adoption of the rules by the Plenary Session of 
national and international judicial officers unanimously.60  
 
To qualify as a civil party, the person must have suffered an injury of either a physical, 
material or psychological nature which is a direct consequence of the offence, personal and 
has actually come into being. 61 Anytime during the investigation, a victim may write to 
the co-investigating judges asking to be a civil party. However, it is within the power of 
the judges to order the application inadmissible, which is then open to appeal.62 If an 
application is found to be admissible, the victim will become a party to the proceedings 
which means they can no longer be questioned as a simple witness. They also have the 
right to be represented by a national lawyer, or an international lawyer with a national 
representative.63 The original rules stated that a group of civil parties may also choose to 
be represented by a single lawyer, or alternatively the co-investigating judges may request 
that a group be represented by a single lawyer. 64 This experimental framework has led to 
difficulties in practice.  
 
  
59 Ignaz Stegmiller “Legal Developments in Civil Party Participation at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia” (2014) 27 LJIL 465 at 466. 
60 “Joint Statement by Judicial Officers: ECCC Plenary Session Unanimously Adopts Internal Rules” (13 
June 2007) The Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia < http://www.eccc.gov.kh/>. 
61 Internal Rules, r 23 (2). 
62 Rule 23 (3). 
63 Rule 23 (6) a. 
64 Rule 23 (8). 
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IV Limitation of Civil Party Rights at the ECCC 
A Limitation during the Trial for Case 001 
Case 001 was the first international or hybrid criminal trial to allow victims to participate 
as civil parties and exposed the impracticalities which large scale victim involvement can 
cause.65 Case 001, which admitted 98 civil parties to the proceedings, saw the trial chamber 
accept a system of grouping civil parties which was suggested by a coalition of NGOs. This 
resulted in the formation of four groups of civil parties, roughly divided based on the NGO 
which was acting as an intermediary between the group and the legal team representing 
them, which consisted of at least one national and one international lawyer.66  
 
During the trial, the court began to limit the scope of civil party participation and this trend 
continued following the trial when alterations to the Internal Rules were made. This began 
when civil party lawyers for one of the groups appealed to the judges to allow them to make 
an opening statement, asserting that they possessed the same right to do so that was given 
to the co-prosecutors and the defendant’s counsel.67 This application was swiftly rejected 
by the judges, stating that there was nothing in the Internal Rules or otherwise which 
guaranteed this right to the victims.68 The judges further stated that although civil parties 
are party to the proceedings, their role in the proceedings is limited to “supporting the 
prosecution” and “do not have an autonomous role to play” at this stage in the 
proceedings.69  The judges gave no wider explanation as to their decision and this was the 
first blow to be dealt to the civil party framework, with many more to follow during the 
trial.  
 
  
65 Stegmiller, above n 59, at 466. 
66 Phuong Pham and others “Victim Participation and the Trial of Duch at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia” (2011) 3 Journal of Human Rights Practice 264 at 269. 
67 Kaing (Decision on the Request of the Co-Lawyers for Civil Party Group 2 to Make an Opening Statement 
During the Substantive Hearing) ECCC Trial Chamber 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 27 March 2009 at [6]. 
68 Kaing (Decision on Civil Party Opening Statements), above n 67, at [6]. 
69 Kaing, (Decision on Civil Party Opening Statements), above n 67, at [9]. 
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The judges later decided that the Internal Rules must generally be interpreted restrictively 
when it came to civil parties and their role in the trial, demonstrating the flaws with the 
flexible framework which had been adopted in the rules.70 Using this restrictive 
interpretation of the rules, it was decided during the trial that civil parties were unable to 
make submissions in relation to sentencing of the accused. This decision was made after 
civil parties requested the right to do so, stating that facts relating to the finding of guilt or 
innocence cannot be separated from those relevant to sentencing.71 It was further argued 
by the civil parties that as many of the civil parties achieved their status as a result of losing 
a relative due to the alleged crimes, their submissions were relevant only at sentencing and 
therefore should be allowed.72 The defence strongly opposed any such involvement, stating 
that civil parties had no role to play in sentencing.73 The Court held that civil parties had 
no interest in making submissions at the sentencing stage of the trial, with their interests 
primarily in reparations and to a limited extent in determining guilt or innocence.74 It was 
further decided that civil parties were not permitted to ask questions in relation to the 
accused’ character. The judges reasoned that this questioning occurred for the purpose of 
determining aggravating and mitigating factors for the eventual sentence, therefore the 
same reasoning applied in relation to sentencing submissions, must be applied here.75 
B Limitation in the Internal Rules Following Case 001 
Modifications to the Rules were made in November 2009 by a plenary session of the Court, 
in light of the majority of the first trial being completed. Plenary sessions generally occur 
at the ECCC every six months and involve all of the judges of the Court coming together 
to discuss amendments to the Internal Rules and administrative guidelines of the Court.76  
  
70 Phuong Pham and others “Victim Participation and the Trial of Duch at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia” (2011) 3 J of HR Prac 264 at 269. 
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Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, 
Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character) ECCC Trial Chamber 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 9 October 
2009 at [4]. 
72 Kaing (Decision on Civil Party Submissions on Sentencing), above n 71, at [4], [6]. 
73 Kaing (Decision on Civil Party Submissions on Sentencing), above n 71, at [1]. 
74 Kaing (Decision on Civil Party Submissions on Sentencing), above n 71, at [33]. 
75 Kaing (Decision on Civil Party Submissions on Sentencing), above n 71, at [46]. 
76 “Plenary Sessions” The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia < http://www.eccc.gov.kh>. 
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The judges concluded that the changes were necessary to meet the requirements of trials of 
mass crimes and to ensure that the “proceedings respond more fully to the needs of the 
victim”.77 It was stated that the changes would promote greater efficiency and the ability 
of the ECCC to reach a verdict.78 The amended version of the civil party rule in the Internal 
Rules of the Court stated that civil parties could only participate in a “consolidated group” 
once the trial stage was reached. The lead civil party co-lawyers would represent the 
interests of the consolidated group as a whole.79 In addition to this, the rules also clarified 
and limited the position of civil parties in relation to reparations, again by consolidating 
the claims of civil parties into a single group.80 
C Limitation during Case 002/01 
The trial for Case 002 continued to limit the rights of civil parties, finding that there was 
no legal basis in the ECCC legal framework for granting the consolidated group of civil 
parties the right to make preliminary remarks during the opening statements of the court.81 
In addition to this, the second trial uncovered problems with the new civil party 
representation framework, seemingly compromising the quality of civil party 
representation. There is criticism regarding the conflicting rules, as one requires individual 
representation for each civil party, while the new rule requires that the lead co-lawyers are 
the only ones to participate in the trial.82 This means individual civil party lawyers are 
dependent on the lead co-lawyers good will to allow them to act. In addition to this, the 
lead international co-lawyer is French, creating a need for translation of documents and, 
therefore, shortening deadlines for English speaking civil party lawyers.83 Another problem 
  
77 “Press Release: Sixth ECCC Plenary Session Concludes” (11 September 2009) The Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia <www.eccc.gov.kh>. 
78 “Press Release: Sixth ECCC Plenary Session Concludes,” above n 77. 
79 Stegmiller, above n 59, at 470. 
80 Johanna Herman “Realities of Victim Participation: The Civil Party System in Practice at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” (2013) 16 Contemporary Justice Rev 461 at 465. 
81 Judge Nil Nonn “Trial Chamber Response to Lead Co-Lawyers and Civil Party Lawyers Request to make 
a brief Preliminary Remarks on behalf of Civil Parties” (15 November 2011) The Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia” <www.eccc.gov.kh>. 
82 The International Federation for Human Rights Victims’ Rights Before the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (FIDH, 2012) at 30. 
83 Herman, above n 80, at 465. 
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is that individual civil party interests can be wide ranging and may sometimes be in conflict 
with the consolidated group, requiring a mechanism to resolve conflicts of interest which 
has so far been unconsidered.84  
 
V The Justifications behind Victim Participation Limitations 
The court has limited victim participation to the extent that it removes the right to 
participate in a significant proportion of the proceedings. It became obvious that changes 
were necessary during the trial due to concerns raised regarding the right of the defendant 
to the fair trial and the need for the trial to be completed in a timely fashion. However, little 
consideration appears to have been given to the victim and the importance of meeting their 
needs within the trial process. The dismissive way the judges have stated in their 
judgments, that victim’s interests are largely limited to reparations, fails to see the bigger 
picture as to what this trial needs to achieve for the future of Cambodia and national 
reconciliation. 
A The Importance of the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial 
The Internal Rules state that civil parties will act in a capacity which supports the 
prosecution, creating confusion regarding what exactly their role entails. 85 This supporting 
role was modelled on the French civil law system, which allows civil parties to play a role 
in supporting the prosecution, while the prosecution conducts most of the hearing and 
trial.86 The Internal Rules seem to envisage a mirroring of this procedure, where civil 
parties would not have a separate role in the proceedings and their actions would remain 
closely linked to those of the prosecution.87  
 
  
84 The International Federation for Human Rights, above n 82, at 35. 
85 Internal Rules, r 23 (1) (a). 
86 David Sokol “Reduced Victim Participation: A Misstep by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of 
Cambodia” (2011) 10 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 167 at 175. 
87 Sokol, above n 86, at 175. 
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A defendant’s right to a fair trial is one of the most well recognised principles in criminal 
proceedings.88 The lack of clarity in the civil party role at the Court creates the risk of 
“double prosecuting” the accused. In the early stages of the first trial the defence raised 
concerns about the rights of the accused being jeopardized by the co-prosecution and civil 
party counsels having more time for questioning than the defence.89 Further criticism was 
made by the defence regarding the nature of the questioning posed by the civil party counsel 
to the accused, which appeared “repetitive and fairly unrelated to the civil parties harm.”90  
 
The concern was addressed by a decision of the Trial Chamber in 2009, stating that it is 
the accused’s right to face only one prosecuting authority and accordingly, “while the civil 
parties have the right to support or assist the prosecution, their role within the trial must 
not, in effect, transform them into additional prosecutors.”91  
 
It is not surprising that following the atrocities which resulted in the trial, for most people 
sympathies lie with victim’s rights rather than the defendants. However, the Internal Rules 
provides that a fundamental principle of proceedings shall be a fair trial and preservation 
of balance between the parties.92 Decisions and statements made by the Court and the 
judges thus far suggest that precedence is being placed on the defendant’s rights, causing 
the civil parties rights to be significantly limited. It is clear from the decisions made by the 
judges that victims now lack the opportunity to be active in the proceedings to the extent 
to which they were originally entitled. This is necessary to ensure a fair trial, although it is 
  
88 Jacob Katz Cogan “International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects” (2002) 27 
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90 Caroline Ehlert and Christine Kaufmann, above n 89, at 32. 
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Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, 
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not desirable for the victims or for the innovative civil party system which was originally 
envisaged.93 
B The Public Interest in Efficient Justice 
The public interest in efficient justice weighs against the importance of victim 
participation, as the extent to which victims participate will inevitably force the extension 
of the proceedings. Time is of the essence; with the atrocities themselves occurred close to 
40 years ago. As the two trials have already illustrated, the accused criminals are aging 
with one accused found unfit to stand trial while the other died during the proceedings.94 
To date, the trials have been slow in comparison to other international criminal tribunals. 
In seven years, the Court has seen only two successful prosecutions and there may only be 
one other. In comparison to this, the SCSL was able to convict 11 perpetrators of crimes 
between its establishment in 2000 and its conclusion in 2012.95 
 
Civil parties, by logic, increase the time taken to complete a trial. One of the lawyers for 
the civil parties in Case 001 stated that it became apparent a few weeks into the trial that to 
allow every civil party group to pose unlimited questions to witnesses, would considerably 
lengthen the duration of the proceedings.96 The large number of civil parties in Case 002 
creates difficulties. 97 These people are victims who seek justice and the truth. However, it 
would cause conflict with both the rights of the defendant and the principle of efficient 
justice to allow each of those victims to tell their story and have an individual role in the 
trial, which is often what they desire.98 The amount of civil parties which the Court has 
  
93 Karim Khan and Daniella Rudy The Right of the Civil Parties to Participate vs. the Right of the Accused 
to a fair and Expeditious Trial: Challenges at the ECCC? (University of Oxford Transitional Justice 
Research, Oxford, 2010) at 2. 
94 For the number of civil parties for each case, see Appendix II. 
95 Lansana Gberie “The Special Court for Sierra Leone Rests for Good” (April 2014) United Nations 
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96 Alain Werner and Danielle Rudy “Civil Party Representation at the ECCC: Sounding the retreat in 
international criminal law?” (2010) 8 North Western J of Int’l HR 301 at 304. 
97 Scully, above n 26, at 32. 
98 Mychelle Balthazard and others Baseline Study of Cambodian Human Rights and Development 
Association’s Civil Party Scheme for Case 002 (Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association, 
Phnom Penh, 2013) at 19. 
21  
 
seen was clearly not comprehended in the original Internal Rules and could only be 
addressed by created a collective group, as has been done. 
C Victim’s Needs  
Studies have found that giving victims a role in the prosecution “assists victims to take 
back control of their lives and ensure that their voices are heard, respected and understood” 
even if that role is limited. 99 It seems questionable whether victims would feel that their 
voices are heard in the case of the ECCC, particularly in Case 002. However, victims do 
have the opportunity to participate, albeit in a very limited way. A study completed in 
Cambodia found that justice was the most frequent answer when a civil party was asked 
why they were participating.100 It can be argued that whether or not the civil party has a 
personal role in the proceedings, justice will be done through the fair trial of the accused 
and perhaps that is sufficient for victims. 
 
Despite this, studies have found value in including victims in proceedings where it is 
possible to do so. At the ECCC, near the conclusion of the Trial in Case 001, two weeks 
were allocated to allow the opportunity for civil parties to recount stories. Sixteen of the 
65 Civil Parties in that case chose to, and the opportunity was “much appreciated” and 
highly emotional for the victims involved.101 One study found that participants in the trial 
of Case 002 had been unable to contribute to the truth telling in a form that would be 
empowering to them.102 Victims have often felt left without genuine apologies and 
explanations from the perpetrators and “unable to trust or forgive Khmer Rouge cadres 
living in their midst”, making reconciliation impossible.103 A study conducted in Cambodia 
found that half of the respondents would be willing to talk openly in a public setting such 
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as a public hearing about what they or their family experienced during the Khmer Rouge 
regime. 104 This may have been what they expected to achieve through the Court process, 
though the limiting decisions of the Court have prevented this from becoming a reality. 
Therefore, an alternative forum should be provided, with these statistics indicating that 
many would potentially say yes to an opportunity to do so. 
 
VI Solutions for the ECCC and Future Contexts 
A The Irreversible Civil Party Framework in Cambodia 
This paper will not address the possibility of the role of victims reverting to simply as 
witnesses, as in other international criminal tribunals. This is because it seems likely that 
victims will have a role in proceedings in the future, with the ICC’s victim participation 
framework and civil law jurisdictions such as the Central African Republic, Burundi and 
Mali, which may require a criminal tribunal of some kind in the future. 
 
Including victims as civil parties allows them to have active involvement in the trial process 
through representation. It also gives them access to confidential, internal documents that 
they may otherwise never see, which may benefit in the individual’s healing process.105 
Allowing their participation is proved to make them feel that they themselves have had a 
role in bringing about justice, the most important role of the Court for them.106 
Additionally, hybrid tribunals are viewed as a way in which the international community 
can aid the “capacity building” of a judicial system and to remove civil parties would be to 
create a Court which would not be representative of the Cambodian legal system.107 This 
would be a significant hindrance to efforts to stabilise and educate on the Cambodian legal 
system. 
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It is unlikely that the Court will make decisions to reverse the limitations which have been 
placed on civil parties. Therefore, these limitations must not be extended any further, as 
civil party participation would become meaningless. Research suggests, as did the UN 
Working Group’s report, that Cambodian’s priority and key interest is in seeing justice 
done at the trials. Without these limiting decisions, the trials would not have been just in 
terms of defendant rights and the two trials would arguably not be finished today, given 
the large number of civil parties. The Court should, therefore, leave in place the civil party 
rules which exist today, while an alternative forum should be created where healing, truth 
and reconciliation can take place. 
B A Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The concept of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was discussed as a potential 
implementation in Cambodia, in the UN Working Group report.  The Report suggested that 
at that stage, Cambodians would not understand the purpose of the commission or its 
relationship to the trial and felt that the priority should be on trials of the Khmer Rouge.108 
Despite this, the report does not dismiss the potential benefits of a TRC for educational, 
psychological and political purposes and providing spiritual reparation for the victims.109 
The report is 15 years old, and a 2013 study found that 40 per cent of civil party respondents 
had become civil parties to tell their story and receive acknowledgment of their suffering, 
and a TRC could provide a suitable forum for that.110 One study found that there is no 
evidence of the ECCC promoting healing for individuals; while a TRC could also fulfil the 
role of healing.111  
 
TRCs have been used in response to conflicts around the world, most notably in South 
Africa post-apartheid.112 The structure and procedure of each TRC which has been used 
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varies greatly depending on the situation to which it responds.113 TRCs can be established 
either nationally by the state or by an international panel, such as the Commission on the 
Truth in El Salvador in 1992.114 It is accepted that truth commissions have three main 
purposes; to uncover the truth, provide a written account of the historical events and to 
acknowledge the past.115 In the context of South Africa, an important though controversial 
element of the TRC was the amnesty for human rights violations which is seen to have 
significantly contributed to the willingness of many of the security forces to speak 
voluntarily at the Commission. 116 It is important to note that empirical studies have found 
that the majority of victims of serious human rights violations seek criminal justice, a role 
which TRCs will never fulfil.117 For that reason, it is submitted that a TRC will not be 
suitable in Cambodia as a “stand-alone” mechanism as it was in South Africa, due to the 
severity and brutality of the crimes which occurred in Cambodia. Alternatively, it could 
work as a complementary mechanism to proceed alongside the ECCC. 
 
A TRC could also provide a mechanism which can incorporate principles of Cambodia’s 
main religion in finding justice. An estimated 93 per cent of Cambodian people are 
Theravada Buddhists, who believe that truth is an essential component of reconciliation.118 
Buddhist principles state that although the truth cannot change the past, it can provide 
important lessons for the future.119 A TRC could provide a forum for the truth and 
reconciliation to be facilitated in line with this. It would also provide a forum in which the 
many Khmer Rouge soldiers who live today to speak the truth, without facing the 
consequences of a criminal trial. 
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C Other Complementary Truth Telling Mechanisms 
1 Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s Special Court was given a similar mandate to that of the ECCC, with 
jurisdiction over only those “who bear the greatest responsibility” for the violations of 
international humanitarian law during the conflict.120 This meant that there were a 
significant number of perpetrators of crime who were left without repercussions for their 
actions. 121A TRC was established in conjunction with the Court, providing a forum where 
those less responsible could speak freely and hear from the victims. In Sierra Leone, the 
two entities worked together although questions were raised regarding coordination 
between the TRC and the Special Court.122  There was no information sharing relationship 
between the two, though studies have shown that perpetrators were often unlikely to offer 
testimony at the TRC for fear of being prosecuted or having to testify against commanders 
at the Special Court.123 This is seen as the most problematic aspect of the TRC in Sierra 
Leone and should be avoided in the future with a formal agreement regarding the 
relationship between the mechanisms, as was put in place in East Timor. This situation is 
where a TRC can provide an alternative forum, where those who are less guilty can speak 
the truth, as can victims and aid reconciliation. 
2 East Timor 
In July 2001, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor established the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CRTR) to promote national 
reconciliation and healing, following years of political conflict in the country between 
independence movement FRETILIN and Indonesia.124 The Commission was designed to 
  
120 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone 2178 UNTS 137 (signed 16 January 2002, entered into force 12 April 2002), 
preamble. 
121 Elizabeth Evenson “Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination between Commission and Court” 
(2004) 104 Colum L Rev 730 at 733. 
122 William Schabas “Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone” (2004) 11 UC Davis J Int’l L & Pol’y 145 at 152. 
123 Bisset, above n 112,at 92. 
124 Carsten Stahn “Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The UN 
Truth Commission” (2001) 95 Am J Int’l L 952 at 953. 
26  
 
act in conjunction with criminal proceedings, conducted by the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (SPSC), within the domestic court structure.125 The SPSC faced significant 
challenges during its existence, largely due to lack of funding from the UN and the 
Timorese government, with the UN unexpectedly announced the ending of their support in 
2004, with 514 investigated cases outstanding.126 These challenges appear unrelated to the 
CRTR and it seems that this was, in itself, relatively successful. The CRTR, like the South 
African TRC, stressed Christian values such as repentance, penitence and forgiveness, 
while other TRC’s have been secular in nature.127 The ability to incorporate values to suit 
the situation are of great benefit, as for example in Cambodia, Buddhist principles and 
values could be incorporated into the TRC.  
 
One element of the CRTR which attracted criticism was the creation of the Commission 
by the UN. It is generally accepted that due to the long term importance and largely 
irreversible nature of a TRC, it should ideally be created by the legislature or executive of 
a democratically-elected government in that country.128 A success of the CRTR was the 
clarification that individual immunity or amnesty was limited to low level crimes that were 
the subject of the reconciliation procedure.129 This was important, as the South African 
TRC received criticism for giving amnesty for serious human rights violations. In contrast 
to the Sierra Leone TRC, the CRTR set out the relationship it had with the SPSC in the 
commission’s enacting legislation. The SPSC had exclusive jurisdiction over serious 
human rights violations and allowed perpetrators of lesser crimes to obtain amnesty by 
completing an act of reconciliation, for example community service.130 By creating an 
agreement between the two mechanisms, it ensures consistency and clarity in the two 
mechanisms’ individual roles and prevented issues relating to information sharing.  
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D A More Informal Solution for Cambodia 
The Cambodian Government is unlikely to agree to a formal TRC. As well as the financial 
burden it would place on the already burdened ECCC, the government does not possess the 
political will to implement such an initiative which would likely damage its reputation.131 
This, along with likely procedural difficulties with establishing a TRC at this stage in the 
trials, makes an informal truth telling mechanisms more feasible. 
 
Town meetings could provide an alternative to a formal TRC and would be economically 
feasible. As discussed above, these are helpful in community outreach and are already 
implemented by NGO’s, but could also provide an opportunity for victims to speak about 
experiences, educate the younger generations and work towards reconciliation. This would 
need to be tested in the Cambodian context to ascertain whether it would be beneficial.  It 
seems likely, based on research conducted and would be in line with Buddhist principles. 
The level of informality could also allow people to express themselves in a way that the 
formality of the ECCC prevents. Additionally, this would be suitable in the Cambodian 
context given the evidence that attending the trial process proves costly and complicated 
for many victims.132 A large proportion of the population lives rurally and in many areas 
there is no working public transport system, making it difficult for victims to attend the 
trial and actively participate as a civil party. Town hall meetings would provide an 
invaluable opportunity for those who wish to talk freely about what they or their family 
members experienced under the Khmer Rouge regime, at a low cost and in an accessible 
way. However, it is again unlikely that the government would allow this, given the risk of 
political unrest and lack of freedom of expression granted in Cambodia.133 
 
E Finding the Right Solution in Future Contexts 
It is important to address the ways in which the ECCC victim participation framework can 
be improved. However, it is equally important to analyse what can be learnt from the Court 
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and the ways in which this can inform future tribunals, and the ICC. The ICC and the recent 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon are examples of courts where greater emphasis is being 
placed upon the role of the victim within the process.  
 
It is clear from these examples and the situation in Cambodia that when deciding what the 
appropriate victim participation model is, the context is the most important consideration. 
In Cambodia, it was particularly relevant that the judicial system is based on a civil law 
model, which led to civil parties being allowed. The weak state of the Cambodian judicial 
system and the insistence of the Cambodian Government that the tribunal not be purely 
international were also important factors.  
 
If an International or Hybrid Criminal Tribunal was to be established again with victims 
taking the role of civil parties, a greater effort would need to be made, to regulate from the 
beginning, the role that civil parties would take. Where the ECCC failed was in its decision 
to give no structure to the civil party framework, other than to define their role as 
“supporting the prosecution”. It should have been foreseen that this would cause problems, 
both with defendant’s rights and with the time taken to conduct the trials. Despite the 
advantages of a flexible framework, in practice this is difficult where victim numbers are 
large. It is important from the start to clearly define the victim role, if it will be more than 
as a simple witness. Whether their role may be merely in gaining reparations, or as part of 
a consolidated group of victims, this must be clear from the beginning to avoid 
misconceptions and therefore causing distrust or frustration towards the judicial system.  
 
The role of outreach in the success of Sierra Leone’s SCSL and TRC must not be 
understated, as it enabled the people of Sierra Leone to understand the process, and 
therefore, justice was seen to be done. This should be a further lesson learned for future 
tribunals that significant resources should be given to an outreach department to ensure an 
understanding and education on the court process. 
 
If a similar framework to the ECCC is to be adopted today, where victim participation is 
now largely limited to claiming reparations, and to a small extent, aiding the finding of 
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guilt or innocence, then an alternative forum for expressing grievances must be assessed. 
The models of Sierra Leone and East Timor provide examples of where a TRC has 
successfully proceeded alongside a court, though the Court itself was less successful in 
East Timor.  Having a dual process creates an environment where victim interests are 
served in two senses, both in their ability to aid the process of finding justice at the court 
and in their ability to be involved in national reconciliation and healing at the TRC. The 
TRC also creates a fair historical account of the atrocities which have occurred and 
therefore helps the country to learn from its past. It is preferable that this TRC be set up by 
the democratically elected government in the state, though UN financial support will often 
be necessary, with countries likely to be in financial difficulty after a conflict. 
 
It is proposed that a “dual” model, as was put in place in East Timor should be considered 
as the best option when looking at models for international or hybrid criminal tribunals. An 
important element of that will be ensuring an agreement is put in place to clarify and assert 
the relationship between the court proceedings and the TRC. The contrasting situations in 
Sierra Leone and East Timor show the value in creating such an agreement, with issues of 
information sharing avoided due to specific agreement about the extent to which this may 
or may not occur. If this model is used, it should only excuse those who have committed 
less serious crimes, as in East Timor. 
 
Proceedings at the ICC should also take into account the possibility of a TRC as a form of 
“outreach” which could occur in the state where the crimes are alleged to have taken place. 
When the ICC established, there were fears that it would prevent countries from finding 
their own ways to protect victims, rebuild societies and stabilise democracy, such as using 
a TRC, due to Article 17 of the Rome Statute.134 Article 17 addresses the complementarity 
principle, which is the doctrine that a country with control of a person accused of violating 
international criminal law has jurisdiction to charge and try that person.135 Article 17 states 
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that the ICC will only assert jurisdiction where that country is unwilling or unable to 
investigate and prosecute that individual.136 Schabas has questioned the ability of a sincere 
truth commission established by the state in question, to prevent the ability of the ICC to 
operate due to Article 17, although stating this was an unlikely interpretation.137  
 
In the ICC context also, a TRC should not be considered as an alternative to prosecution 
and should not meet the Article 17 requirements, as from the victims perspective, the 
gravity of crimes will often require retributive justice against those most responsible. In 
situations with large numbers of perpetrators or crimes, a TRC may be able to work 
alongside ICC proceedings. The ICC is able to try only those responsible for the most 
serious crime of concern to the international community as a whole. 138 Therefore a TRC 
could provide a forum to examine the actions of those who have committed less serious 
crimes within the conflict.  It will always depend on the circumstances, but a TRC can 
provide an accessible forum for the truth, which proceedings at the ICC are unable to do. 
 
VII Conclusion 
The scope and severity of the Khmer Rouge’s actions in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 
created the necessity for a large scale international criminal tribunal, which would never 
have come without significant challenges. Those challenges continue as the Cambodian 
Government hinders the Court’s progress. Despite this, the Court persists and it is of 
upmost importance to those inside and outside of Cambodia that the court continues and 
concludes its work, to find justice for those victims, both dead and still living. The civil 
party framework allows, in theory, victims to play an active role in the trial. However, in 
practice, the implementation of the civil party participation has created many challenges. 
 
The key challenge within the Court is the unclear provisions relating to civil party 
participation, which have caused conflict with the right of the defendant to a fair trial and 
  
136 The Rome Statute, Article 17. 
137 William Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 347. 
138 The Rome Statute, Article 5. 
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the public interest in efficient justice, leading to the reduction of civil party rights. The 
lessening of civil party participation in the proceedings is a significant blow to victims, 
though if it ensures justice is done, it may meet the victim’s needs. However, if this 
approach is to be taken then it must be ensured that another forum is provided to the 
victims, to tell their stories and play a part in the reconciliation process. 
 
It is clear that in the context of the ECCC, the decisions which have been made are largely 
irreversible and due to the political environment, it is unlikely that any greater role will be 
given to the victims in Cambodia. However, there are important lessons to be learned from 
the ECCC. It is clear that from the outset, legislation or internal rules must play a greater 
role in regulating the role of victims within the process to avoid confusion. In addition, 
outreach should be given effect to from the beginning of the process. Where there are large 
numbers of victims, a TRC can be an effective mechanism to consider, which will ensure 
victim participation within the reconciliation process. Victim participation frameworks in 
an international or hybrid court process, must be based on considerations of the particular 
context which the court responds to. As well as context, lessons learned from courts such 
as the ECCC should be considered, to determine which framework will deliver the best 
results for victims while maintaining a fair and efficient tribunal process.  
 
 
 
 
 
VIII Appendices 
A Appendix I 
 
Status of Cases at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
Case 001 
Accused  Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch 
Status:  
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Case 001 Trial Chamber found him guilty of crimes against humanity and 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.139 
 
Case 002 
Accused  Khieu Samphan 
Status 
Case 002/01  Trial chamber found him guilty of crimes against humanity.140 
 
Case 002/02 Case in the process of meeting procedural requirements before the 
trial can begin.141 
 
Accused  Nuon Chea 
Status  
Case 002/01  Trial Chamber found guilty of crimes against humanity.142 
 
Case 002/02 Case in the process of meeting procedural requirements before the 
trial can begin.143 
 
Accused Ieng Sary 
Status Deceased (2013).144 
 
Accused Ieng Thirth 
Status Found unfit to stand trial (2012).145 
 
Case 003 
Accused  Unknown identities (two accused) 
Status Under investigation by the co-investigating judges after 
introductory submissions filed in 2009.146 
  
139 Kaing (Judgment) ECCC Trial Chamber 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July, 2010 at [568]. 
140 Case 002/01 (Judgment) ECCC Trial Chamber 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, 7 August, 2014 at 622. 
141 “Case 002/02” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2013) <www.eccc.gov.kh>. 
142 Case 002/01, above n 140, at 622. 
143 “Case 002/02” Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2013) <www.eccc.gov.kh>. 
144 “Case 002/02”, above n 143. 
145 “Case 002/02”, above n 143. 
146 Kheang Un “The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search for Justice” (2013) 72 J of 
Asian Studies 783 at 785. 
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Case 004 
Accused  Unknown identities (three accused) 
Status Under investigation by the co-investigating judges after 
introductory submissions filed in 2009.147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B Appendix II 
 
Number of Individual Civil Parties Admitted to Proceeding in Each Case 
 
Case 001   93 parties.148 
 
Case 002  3866 parties.149 
 
  
147 Un, above n 146, at 785. 
148 The International Federation for Human Rights, above n 82, at 34.  
149 The International Federation for Human Rights, above n 82, at 34. 
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The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, footnotes, appendices and bibliography) 
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